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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of the shift away from a US dollar focus of 
systemically important emerging market economies (EMEs) on configurations 
between the US dollar, the euro and the yen. Given the difficulty that fixed or 
managed US dollar exchange rate regimes remain pervasive and reserve compositions 
mostly kept secret, the identification strategy of the paper is to analyse the market 
impact on major currency pairs of official statements made by EME policy-makers 
about their exchange rate regime and reserve composition. Developing a novel data-
base for 18 EMEs, we find that such statements not only have a statistically but also 
an economically significant impact on the euro, and to a lesser extent the yen against 
the US dollar. The findings suggest that communication hinting at a weakening of 
EMEs’ US dollar focus contributed substantially to the appreciation of the euro 
against the US dollar in recent years. Interestingly, EME policy-makers appear to 
have become more cautious in their communication more recently. Overall, the results 
underscore the growing systemic importance of EMEs for global exchange rate 
configurations.
Keywords: communication, exchange rate regime, reserves, euro, dollar, emerging 
economies 
JEL Classification: E58, F30, F31, F36, G15 5
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Non-technical summary 
How would a change to the exchange rate regimes of China and oil-exporting 
countries affect exchange rate configurations across major currencies? And similarly, 
how does a diversification and rebalancing of global foreign exchange reserves alter 
these currency configurations? These are arguably two of today’s most pertinent 
issues influencing exchange rate dynamics, in particular of the US dollar, the euro and 
the yen. Understanding the answers to these questions is also crucial for gauging the 
direction in which the international monetary system may evolve, and the role that the 
US dollar and the euro will play in the future. 
This paper exploits the market reaction to official communications by key 
policy-makers of systemically important emerging market economies (EMEs) in order 
to identify their effect on G3 exchange rates. These are statements that provide 
information to financial markets about policy-makers’ views and preferences about 
exchange rates and reserves. While this empirical strategy surely only captures a 
limited share of the true information that becomes available to financial markets about 
EME currency and reserve choices, the strength of this approach is that it allows for a 
clean identification of factors that are specific to these EMEs, and the measurement of 
how they affect global exchange rate configurations. In short, the estimation of the 
impact of such communications at daily frequency enables us to obtain an idea of how 
global exchange rate configurations are affected by an overall shift of EMEs away 
from pursuing an exchange rate strategy with a sole focus on the US dollar. 
The paper develops a novel database of statements by key policy-makers of 18 
EMEs – including China, Russia, countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: 
Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar) as well as other smaller 
EMEs – comprising statements on these countries’ exchange rate regimes and reserve 
composition. Overall, our novel database includes 199 statements on the exchange 
rate regime and 68 statements on foreign reserves by policy-makers in the 18 EMEs. 
Our primary interest is on how such communication affects G3 exchange 
rates, i.e. the reaction of the euro and the yen vis-à-vis the US dollar. The motivation 
for analysing this issue is both academic – as it helps shed light on what drives major 
exchange rates – and of relevance from a policy perspective – as the impact of 
exchange rate regime choices by China and oil exporting countries continues to 
dominate the policy debate on global currencies. We test this hypothesis using daily 
exchange rate returns of the US dollar-euro, US dollar-yen and the nominal effective 
exchange rates of the euro, US dollar and yen in the period 2000-07. 
The main finding of the paper is that statements on exchange rates and 
reserves by EME policy-makers exert a statistically significant and economically 
meaningful impact on the euro and on the yen vis-à-vis the US dollar. Overall, it is the 
euro that is affected the strongest. On average, an EME statement pointing at the 
possibility of loosening the US dollar peg or diversifying reserves leads to an 
appreciation of 0.25% of the euro, and 0.15% of the yen against the US dollar. In turn, 
the US dollar nominal effective exchange rate depreciates by an average 0.11% when 
such statements occur. What seems striking is that the average effect of a statement by 6
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Chinese or GCC officials on the euro or yen against the US dollar is comparable in 
size to that of euro area and Japanese officials. Of course it needs to be stressed that 
the latter policy-makers generally communicate much more frequently on exchange 
rates than the former. But, overall, the result underlines that financial markets pay 
very close attention to statements by these EMEs, and that this reflects not only 
expectations about the sustainability of EMEs’ currency regimes, but has a marked 
impact on the US dollar against the yen and in particular against the euro. 
It is of course difficult to gauge to what extent the magnitude of these 
estimates is economically relevant. Calculating the cumulated effect of EME 
statements by year shows that statements by EME officials led to an appreciation of 
the euro against the US dollar by as much as 7 percentage points in 2006. This indeed 
seems very substantial. Nevertheless, there is strong time variation in the effect of 
EME communication on major currencies. Few EME policy-makers talked openly 
about reforming exchange rate regimes or diversifying reserves before 2003, so that 
such communication had a relatively small overall relevance for the US dollar-euro 
exchange rate before 2003. Interestingly, the effect of EMEs on global exchange rate 
configurations also seems to have declined markedly in 2007. This might reflect the 
much more cautious communication of EMEs, possibly due to the increased pressure 
on their currency pegs from capital inflows and expectations about currency reform. 
The findings of the paper have a number of policy implications. First, they 
point out clearly that important EMEs, such as China, Russia and the GCC 
economies, have a systematic and sizeable impact on global exchange rate 
configurations. In particular given the magnitude of the reserves held by these 
countries, any shift in market expectations that one or several of these countries could 
loosen their close US dollar peg or diversify reserves affects also the major currency 
pairs, and in particular the euro. The results obviously do not contain any implications 
about what an optimal exchange rate regime choice is for these economies. But the 
findings suggest that policy-makers in these economies are increasingly becoming 
aware of the impact of their statements on global financial markets. This underlines 
that communication can be an important and effective policy tool that needs to be 
used with caution and with a clear idea of what it aims to achieve. 7
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1. Introduction 
How would a change to the exchange rate regimes of China and oil-exporting 
countries affect exchange rate configurations across major currencies? And similarly, 
how does a diversification and rebalancing of global foreign exchange reserves alter 
these currency configurations? These are arguably two of today’s most pertinent 
issues influencing exchange rate dynamics, in particular of the US dollar, the euro and 
the yen. Understanding the answers to these questions is also crucial for gauging the 
direction in which the international monetary system may evolve, and the role that the 
US dollar and the euro will play in the future. 
The fundamental difficulty for understanding the potential implications of this 
regime shift is that many of the systemically important emerging market economies 
(EMEs) still maintain a fixed or at least highly inflexible exchange rate regime vis-à-
vis the US dollar. Hence it is difficult to predict what major currency configurations 
will be once EMEs have moved to more flexible and open currency regimes. 
Moreover, the composition and diversification decisions of reserves by most EMEs 
are mostly closely held secret.  
This paper exploits the market reaction to official communications by key 
policy-makers of systemically important EMEs in order to overcome these 
difficulties. These are statements that provide information to financial markets about 
policy-makers’ views and preferences about exchange rates and reserves. While this 
empirical strategy surely only captures a limited share of the true information that 
becomes available to financial markets about EME currency and reserve choices, the 
strength of this approach is that it allows for a clean identification of factors that are 
specific to these EMEs, and the measurement of how they affect global exchange rate 
configurations. In short, the estimation of the impact of such communications at daily 
frequency enables us to obtain an idea of how global exchange rate configurations are 
affected by an overall shift of EMEs away from pursuing an exchange rate strategy 
with a sole focus on the US dollar. 
The paper develops a novel database of statements by key policy-makers of 18 
EMEs – including China, Russia, countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: 
Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar) as well as other smaller 
EMEs – comprising statements on these countries’ exchange rate regimes and reserve 
composition. In fact, there have been frequent statements in recent years by policy-
makers from most of these EMEs in that they are considering or pursuing an objective 
of moving away from a pure US dollar peg, or that they are contemplating reserve 
diversification out of US dollar assets. These intensified in 2003/04 as the US dollar 
started declining, and they peaked in 2006. Interestingly, policy-makers in China and 
in oil-exporting countries appear to have become much more cautious in their 
communication about moving away from the US dollar in 2007, possibly partly 
reflecting the increased capital flows into these economies due to changed 
expectations about currency and reserve policies. Overall, our novel database includes 
199 statements on the exchange rate regime and 68 statements on foreign reserves by 
policy-makers in the 18 EMEs. 8
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Our primary interest is on how such communication affects G3 exchange 
rates, i.e. the reaction of the euro and the yen vis-à-vis the US dollar. The motivation 
for analysing this issue is both academic – as it helps shed light on what drives major 
exchange rates – and of relevance from a policy perspective – as the impact of 
exchange rate regime choices by China and oil exporting countries continues to 
dominate the policy debate on global currencies.  
Our hypothesis is that if market participants consider such statements as 
credible and expect them to have an impact on major currencies, then we would 
expect that these statements have a depreciating effect on the US dollar against the 
euro and the yen. This prior follows the following logic. EME statements indicating a 
reserve diversification out of US dollars or the desirability of an appreciation of the 
domestic currency against the US dollar should both weaken the US dollar against 
other major currencies, and primarily through a portfolio balance channel as it may 
indicate ongoing or planned diversification out of US dollar assets. This channel has 
indeed been shown to have played some role in the past for FX interventions by 
central banks (see e.g. Branson, 1977; Dominguez and Frankel, 1993). But the effect 
of statements by EME authorities may also occur through a coordination channel, as 
formulated by Sarno and Taylor (2001), in which they may trigger and help 
coordinate expectations among market participants. Statements interpreted as 
suggesting a weakening by EMEs of their exchange rate policy’s strong US dollar 
focus might, in turn, be interpreted as a signal that relative demand for global 
currencies is fundamentally changing, along with the future course of the international 
monetary system’s nature. 
We test this hypothesis using daily exchange rate returns of the US dollar-
euro, US dollar-yen and the nominal effective exchange rates of the euro, US dollar 
and yen in the period 2000-07. We attempt to control for other factors that may 
influence the estimations, in particular statements on exchange rates by G3 policy-
makers (US, euro area and Japan) as well as a broad set of macroeconomic news. 
The main finding of the paper is that statements on exchange rates and 
reserves by EME policy-makers exert a statistically significant and economically 
meaningful impact on the euro and on the yen vis-à-vis the US dollar. Overall, it is the 
euro that is affected the strongest. On average, an EME statement pointing at the 
possibility of loosening the US dollar peg or diversifying reserves leads to an 
appreciation of 0.25% of the euro, and 0.15% of the yen against the US dollar. In turn, 
the US dollar nominal effective exchange rate depreciates by an average 0.11% when 
such statements occur. What seems striking is that the average effect of a statement by 
Chinese or GCC officials on the euro or yen against the US dollar is comparable in 
size to that of euro area and Japanese officials. Of course it needs to be stressed that 
the latter policy-makers generally communicate much more frequently on exchange 
rates than the former. But, overall, the result underlines that financial markets pay 
very close attention to statements by these EMEs, and that this reflects not only 
expectations about the sustainability of EMEs’ currency regimes, but has a marked 
impact on the US dollar against the yen and in particular against the euro. 9
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It is of course difficult to gauge to what extent the magnitude of these 
estimates is economically relevant. Calculating the cumulated effect of EME 
statements by year shows that statements by EME officials led to an appreciation of 
the euro against the US dollar by as much as 7 percentage points in 2006. This indeed 
seems very substantial. Nevertheless, there is strong time variation in the effect of 
EME communication on major currencies. Few EME policy-makers talked openly 
about reforming exchange rate regimes or diversifying reserves before 2003, so that 
such communication had a relatively small overall relevance for the US dollar-euro 
exchange rate before 2003. Interestingly, the effect of EMEs on global exchange rate 
configurations also seems to have declined markedly in 2007. This might reflect the 
much more cautious communication of EMEs, possibly due to the increased pressure 
on their currency pegs from capital inflows and expectations about currency reform. 
We conduct various extensions and modifications to check the robustness of 
the findings. Overall, the estimates are quite similar across China, Russia and GCC 
countries. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that, on a cumulated basis, statements 
by GCC officials seem to have had a somewhat larger effect on the US dollar-euro 
than those by Chinese or Russian authorities. The findings are also robust to 
alternative classifications of the statements and their underlying intentions. Moreover, 
we control for various macroeconomics news from the United States and the euro 
area, as well as statements on exchange rates by G3 authorities. In all cases, the 
benchmark results are robust to these extensions. 
As to the final part of the empirical analysis, we try to gauge the channels 
through which EME statements affect major currencies. One hypothesis that is 
implicit in the analysis above is that statements by EME authorities either trigger or 
confirm market expectations about the likelihood of a change to the exchange rate 
regime or to reserve composition. We find some evidence that suggests that this 
expectations channel is indeed important as the effect of a given statement is larger 
when also market expectations about a future change in the domestic currency regime, 
as proxied from the spread between non-deliverable forward and spot rates, increase. 
The findings of the paper have a number of policy implications. First, they 
point out clearly that important EMEs, such as China, Russia and the GCC 
economies, have a systematic and sizeable impact on global exchange rate 
configurations. In particular given the magnitude of the reserves held by these 
countries, any shift in market expectations that one or several of these countries could 
loosen their close US dollar peg or diversify reserves affects also the major currency 
pairs, and in particular the euro. The results obviously do not contain any implications 
about what an optimal exchange rate regime choice is for these economies. But the 
findings suggest that policy-makers in these economies are increasingly becoming 
aware of the impact of their statements on global financial markets. This underlines 
that communication can be an important and effective policy tool that needs to be 
used with caution and with a clear idea of what it aims to achieve. 
The paper is related to various strands in the literature. It fits most closely into 
the rapidly growing literature on the role of communication in managing market 
expectations, not just in the area of monetary policy, but also of exchange rates 10
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(Blinder et al., 2008). While there is ample evidence that actual FX interventions by 
monetary authorities influence currency values, there is also a growing area of the 
literature that shows that communication can be an effective tool in guiding foreign 
exchange markets (Beine et al. 2006; Fratzscher 2008a; Jansen and De Haan 2005, 
2007; Dominguez and Panthaki 2007; Siklos and Bohl forthcoming). In fact there is 
evidence that communication may to some extent and under some conditions be a 
substitute to actual interventions in that it affects markets quite independently of the 
latter (Fratzscher 2008c), and also that credible communication overall enhances the 
effectiveness of actual interventions (Egert 2007).
The critical question is how communication can be successful in managing 
expectations and thus influence exchange rates. The seminal work by Sarno and 
Taylor (2001) stresses the functioning of a coordination channel, in which 
communication may not only provide new information to markets, but in which it 
coordinates market beliefs and moves market participants to act in a coordinated way. 
There is indeed evidence that such a channel is at work for FX communication in the 
context of major economies (Taylor 2004, Reitz and Taylor 2006, Fratzscher 2008b). 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses in detail the 
construction of our database on communication by EME authorities, both on FX 
regimes and on reserve diversification. Section 3 then gives the benchmark results and 
provides a number of extensions and robustness checks. Section 4 summarises the 
findings and concludes with a discussion of policy implications. 
2. Data and methodology 
We aim to obtain a list of public statements about the domestic exchange rate regime 
and reserve diversification by relevant policy-makers in 18 emerging market 
economies (China, 6 other emerging Asian economies
1, 6 Gulf Cooperation Council 
economies
2 and Russia), which include also four more “other” EMEs, namely: Iraq, 
Iran, North Korea and Venezuela, which all have switched, or signalled their intention 
to do so, part of their international transactions (e.g. oil sales) or foreign reserves in 
euros. Our aim is to collect a list of public statements about (i) the role of the US 
dollar in their exchange rate regime and (ii) the composition of their foreign reserve 
assets that is as comprehensive as possible. Moreover, as a control group we collect 
statements about exchange rates by the three main currency economies, the US, the 
euro area and Japan. 
To that end, we first identify the relevant policy-makers to include. As regards 
emerging market economies, we collect statements by central bank Governors in a 
systematic fashion, given that central banks in these economies are responsible for 
exchange rate policy and interventions in foreign exchange markets. When available, 
however, we also collect statements by Ministers of Finance and central bank Vice-
Governors, although these tend to be less frequent. For China, we also have 
1 These include Hong-Kong, India, Malaysia, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea. 
2 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 11
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statements by the President of the People’s Republic, the Premier and representatives 
of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange who have occasionally – albeit 
relatively rarely – expressed public views on the renminbi and/or on the composition 
of China’s reserves. A list of those policy-makers broken down by nationality and 
institution is provided in Appendix I. 
Turning to our control group, i.e. G3 authorities, primarily statements of the 
Treasury Secretary and of the Deputy Treasury Secretary are included for the United 
States, given that exchange rate policy lies in the realm of the US Treasury 
Department.
3 For the euro area, the European Union Treaty specifies a close 
coordination between the ECB and the Eurogroup, which both share the responsibility 
for official exchange rate communication. However, the ECB alone is in charge of 
actual foreign exchange interventions, with its overarching aim remaining the 
maintenance of price stability. Statements are therefore extracted for the members of 
the ECB Governing Council. Japan’s exchange rate policy officially lies in the realm 
of the Ministry of Finance, although members of the Bank of Japan’s Policy Board 
have tended to make regular statements on the yen. Hence we collect statements by 
both the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Bank of Japan. 
Public statements generally stem from three sources: speeches, interviews and 
public testimonies. In order to ensure that these public statements were also available 
to market participants in financial markets, one of the most commonly used wire 
services, Reuters News, was chosen to extract all news releases for the period 1 
January 2000 to 31 December 2007, partly building on the database for the US, euro 
area and Japan in Fratzscher (2008c). These releases were obtained through Factiva. 
Reuters News has the advantage of being one of the most comprehensive wire 
services, reporting on and disseminating all major news in a timely fashion, usually 
within a short timeframe after a public announcement. It is also among those 
providers which receive greatest attention among traders and investors. This allows 
using daily data to analyse the impact of statements on exchange rates, taking 
exchange rate quotes at 18.00 EST, i.e. closing prices of the New York markets.
4
In selecting the statements, the search criteria for public statements on the role 
of the US dollar in the exchange rate regime of emerging market economies were: 
(a) the name or the title of the policy-maker, 
(b) the word “exchange rate” or the name of the domestic currency and 
3 Extending the analysis to other officials, such as the Under Secretaries of the Treasury and of the 
Federal Reserve does not add many observations. Federal Reserve officials have made remarkably few 
public statements about the US dollar. 
4 Arguably an alternative might be to use intraday data together with the time stamps corresponding to 
the statements of our database. However, using intraday data is not a feasible option for improving our 
identification scheme because the reports of Reuters News are the articles summarising a particular 
statement by a policy-maker. These articles may come as soon as 20 minutes after a particular 
statement, or they become available several hours later in the day. Hence we cannot measure the high-
frequency market response of a statement because no data is available for the initial “snaps” (i.e. real-
time reporting of headlines containing at most a few words, which may occur within seconds after a 
statement). 12
ECB
Working Paper Series No 973
November 2008
(c) the words “stable” or “stability” or “flexible” or “flexibility” or “dollar” or 
“peg”.
Likewise, the search criteria for statements on the composition of foreign 
exchange reserves were: 
(a) the name or the title of the policy-maker, 
(b) the word “reserves” and 
(c) the words “composition” or “diversification” or “portfolio” or 
“rebalancing” or “dollar”. 
Last, the search criteria used for the United States, the euro area and Japan 
were:
(a) the name or the title of the policy-maker and  
(b) the word “exchange rate” or the name of the domestic currency.
Clearly, a crucial issue is how to classify the statements in terms of both 
content and meaning. For emerging markets, statements St are categorised as either 
advocating that the reference to the US dollar in the exchange rate regime will be 
relaxed in order to let the domestic currency appreciate, or to let the domestic 
currency depreciate or that the exchange rate regime will be maintained. 
US dollar reference is relaxed to appreciate 















US dollar reference is relaxed to depreciate 
Appendix II contains examples of statements for each of those categories. 
We expect that relaxing the US dollar reference to appreciate also contributes 
to an appreciation of the euro or the yen vis-à-vis the US dollar through the ‘portfolio 
balance channel’ (see e.g. Branson, 1977; Dominguez and Frankel, 1993; Greenspan, 
2004). This relaxation would indeed imply that emerging market economies reduce 
their purchases of US dollar-denominated securities and, in turn, decrease demand for 
US dollars. Ultimately, this would contribute to a depreciation of the US dollar vis-à-
vis other currencies, including the euro and the yen. A coordination channel might 
also be at play (Sarno and Taylor, 2001), in which market participants might interpret 
statements by emerging economies suggesting a weakening of their exchange rate 
policy’s strong US dollar focus as a signal that relative demand for global currencies 
is fundamentally changing, along with the future course of the international monetary 
system’s nature, which thus help coordinate investor expectations. 
Moreover, emerging market statements referring to the composition of foreign 
exchange reserves are classified as either suggesting diversification away from the US 13
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dollar, diversification into the US dollar or that the composition of reserves is 
maintained: 
Diversification out of the US dollar















Diversification into the US dollar 
Appendix II contains examples of statements for each of those categories. 
In the same vein, given that a large – if not dominant – share of emerging 
market reserves are denominated in US dollars (see e.g. ECB, 2008), we expect 
statements that signal intentions to diversify across currencies and/or instruments to 
contribute to an appreciation of the euro or the yen vis-à-vis the US dollar. 
For the United States, the euro area and Japan, statements IOt are categorised 
as either advocating a stronger domestic currency (“strengthen”), a weaker domestic 
currency (“weaken”), or as being “neutral” in the following way: 
















Intention to “weaken” the domestic currency 
The classification is a judgmental one and clearly in some cases difficult to 
make. Three points should be noted. First, the classification is done in a mechanical 
way, i.e. all statements are classified based on their language content and not based on 
their effect and importance for asset prices. Second, the only statements that are not 
classified and left out from the dataset are those that occurred on days of monetary 
policy meetings of the respective central banks or in monetary policy testimonies to 
the respective parliaments. It was also checked whether exchange rate statements take 
place during release days of relevant macroeconomic data. It is important to control 
for such events because the news content of monetary policy statement or data 
releases may have a dominant effect on those days. Third, the advantage in using 
newswire services is that interpretation of the statements is provided by professionals 
who are aware of nuances and experienced in interpreting them. In this respect, small 
changes to standard language may often occur intentionally to “convey a message” 
and have a large effect on financial markets. To account for this, we also use a 
dummy variable which equals 1 when a statement deviates from the predominant 
policy mantra and 0 otherwise. 
Several additional caveats should be borne in mind, however. A first caveat is 
that newswire reports may not reflect the true intention of policy-makers. Moreover, 
some public statements may not be covered, or may to some extent contain Reuters’ 
interpretation. Hence the list of statements may not constitute a complete list of 14
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official communications but only a list of statements as reported by Reuters. The 
objective of our paper is to analyse the reaction of market participants to policy-
makers’ communication. It therefore seems sensible to focus only on those statement 
that actually become available to market participants and, again, Reuters News is
among those providers that receive greatest attention among traders and investors. 
Last, other important statements, such as those by the G7, are not included as they 
generally cannot be attributed to a single country’s policy-makers alone and do not 
refer to an individual currency (see Fratzscher 2008b for an empirical analysis of the 
market impact of such statements). 
Tables 1.1–1.2 
Table 1.1 provides a summary of the around 200 statements by emerging 
market authorities we found with regard to the use of the US dollar as an anchor 
currency over January 2000-December 2007. The bulk of these statements (about 
75%) are from Chinese authorities
5; 19% are from Gulf Cooperation Council 
authorities
6 and 6% from Russian authorities.
7 In terms of meaning and content, about 
two-thirds of the statements repeat a mantra that the exchange rate regime will remain 
unchanged and are classified as neutral. A quarter of the statements are classified as 
conveying a message that the reference to the US dollar in the exchange rate regime 
will be relaxed in order to let the domestic currency appreciate (e.g. when China 
switched from a strict US dollar peg to a regime allowing for more exchange rate 
flexibility). A few statements are classified as conveying a message that the reference 
to the US dollar might be relaxed to let the domestic currency depreciate (e.g. when 
uncertainties mounted in the wake of the Asian crisis as to whether the Chinese 
renminbi might be devalued). 
Statements on the composition of foreign reserve assets by emerging market 
authorities are fewer (about 70) than those on the exchange rate regime and are 
summarised in Table 1.2. Less than one-fifth are from China (also in contrast with 
statements on the exchange rate regime), with the Governor of the People’s Bank of 
China and representatives from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange being 
the main authors. More than one-third of the statements are from other emerging 
Asian economies (notably South Korea) and another third by Gulf Cooperation 
Council authorities. The remaining statements are from Russian authorities. In terms 
of meaning and content, the largest share (two-thirds) of the statements is classified as 
conveying a message that diversification across currencies and/or instruments is 
sought. One-fifth of the statements that repeat a mantra that the composition of 
foreign reserve assets will remain unchanged are classified as neutral. A few 
statements are classified as indicating that diversification into US dollars is sought. 
Figures 1 – 2 
5 More than one-half of these statements are from the President of the People’s Bank of China. 
6 More than one-half of these statements are from the Governor of the Central Bank of the United Arab 
Emirates.
7 These statements are exclusively from the Chairman or the First Deputy Chairman of the Central 
Bank of the Russian Federation. 15
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To further give an intuition of the data, Figures 1.1 and 1.2 plot over time the 
statements by emerging market officials relating to the exchange rate regime together 
with the USD/EUR. Statements by Chinese authorities are broadly spread over 2000-
2007, but they were markedly more frequent in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, when 
the debate about a possible devaluation of the renminbi mounted and after 2004/5 
with the relaxation of the US dollar peg and the adoption of a currency basket. 
Statements by Gulf Cooperation Council authorities have become increasingly 
frequent after the revaluation of the Kuwaiti Dinar vis-à-vis the US dollar in May 
2006. Likewise, statements by Russian authorities have become increasingly frequent 
after the introduction of an exchange rate basket including the US dollar and the euro 
in February 2005. Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 plot over time the statements by emerging 
market officials referring to the composition of their foreign reserve assets together 
with the USD/EUR. It is interesting to note that statements became significantly more 
frequent after 2004, when the size of emerging market reserve assets started to grow 
considerably. 
3. Empirical findings 
We now turn to the empirical analysis and the findings. We start by outlining the 
benchmark results and discuss their economic significance (section 3.1) before testing 
their robustness and presenting various extensions and modifications to the 
benchmark (section 3.2). 
3.1 Benchmark model and results 
As outlined in detail above, our primary interest is in understanding how 
statements by EME officials affect major currencies, and in particular the euro and the 
yen vis-à-vis the US dollar. Our starting point is the microstructure literature of FX 
markets, and more specifically the literature on announcement effects and asset prices 
(e.g. Andersen et al. 2003, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2005). This literature commonly 
models the exchange rate in a standard asset-pricing framework, where the log 
exchange rate st is a function of the discounted value of private sector expectations 
about future fundamentals ft+i:
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with ȍt as the public information available at time t, and ș as the discount factor. 
Since our objective is to understand the effect of public statements by policy-makers 
on exchange rates, we follow the announcement literature and formulate a dynamic 
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with 1     t t t s s r . The implication is that what drives exchange rates are changes to 
expectations by market participants about relevant future fundamentals. Reserve 16
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diversification and changes in the exchange rate regime of EMEs and oil exporting 
countries may precisely be such fundamentals, and the objective of the paper is to test 
for their empirical relevance for major currency configurations. From this simple, 
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with rt as daily exchange rate returns over January 2000-December 2007, S
e a [-1; 0; 
+1] indicator variable for statements on exchange rate regimes, S
res a corresponding 
indicator variable for communications on reserves, and X  a vector of controls 
including statements by G3 authorities and day-of-the-week effects in the benchmark, 
and later also macroeconomic news and other controls in the extended specifications.  
Daily return data exhibit strong heteroskedasticity, which we correct for by using 
robust standard errors. In one of the robustness tests discussed in section 3.2, we also 
model exchange rate returns using an EGARCH specification, i.e. in which we model 
both the conditional mean and the conditional variance of exchange rate returns. 
However, as our main interest is in the conditional mean of currency returns, 
estimating the mean equation via OLS with robust standard errors is sufficient for our 
purpose.
Table 2 
Table 2 shows the benchmark results when pooling all EME statements, i.e. 
those on exchange rates and on reserves, into a single variable so that S = S
e + S
res.
There are two main results worth emphasising. The first one is that statements by 
EMEs matter, as they clearly have a statistically significant effect on the euro and on 
the yen vis-à-vis the US dollar. On average, a statement by EME officials moves the 
euro by 0.25% and the yen by 0.15% against the US dollar. It is hard to gauge 
whether these effects are sizeable. One possible interpretation for why the effects on 
the euro are larger than on the yen is that a larger share of reserve diversification may 
go into euro denominated assets than in yen denominated assets, and market 
participants may correctly anticipate this fact. 
One way to compare them is with corresponding statements by officials of the 
US, the euro area and Japan. Models (1) and (3) of Table 2 indicate that the effect of 
EME statements are indeed comparable in magnitude to those of G3 officials, bar the 
US.
8 Models (2) and (4) use as controls only the statements by the main G3 policy-
makers in charge of exchange rate policy (the US Treasury Secretary, the ECB 
8 In fact, statements by US authorise are barely ever statistically significant. This is in line with the 
literature, which explains the small or negligible effect of US statements by the fact that US policy-
makers tend to repeat their standard mantra advocating a strong dollar policy, thereby providing no 
new information to markets. Their statements thus tend to have a small effect, except when US officials 
deviate from this mantra (see e.g. Fratzscher 2008c). 17
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President, and the Japanese Minister of Finance). The point estimates of EME 
statements basically remain unchanged, underlining their robustness. 
An important point to note at this juncture concerns the permanence of the 
effects of EME statements. The contemporaneous effects, as presented in Table 2, are 
meaningful for the relevance of such statements only to the extent that they are lasting 
or permanent. Extending this model to a dynamic specification shows that all of the 
effect of EME statements on exchange rates takes place on the same day, while 
coefficients for lagged effects are always statistically insignificant. In line with the 
findings of the microstructure literature, this implies that the contemporaneous effects 
can indeed be interpreted as the overall, lasting effects of such events.  
A second finding is that the effect of EME statements tends to be substantially 
larger on the euro than on the yen. This is also confirmed when analysing the reaction 
of the three G3 nominal effective exchange rates in models (5)-(7) of Table 2. 
Interestingly, the strongest reaction among the effective exchange rates is for the US 
dollar, which depreciates on average by around 0.11% in response to EME statements 
about relaxing their link to the US currency. This seems quite a sizeable effect 
considering that many EMEs continue to have managed or fixed exchange rates 
against the US dollar. 
Figures 3 – 4 
A crucial issue is to what extent these estimates are economically meaningful. 
In particular, how much of the euro and yen movements against the US dollar can be 
explained by EMEs and their intentions to loosen their US dollar peg and diversify 
their reserves out of US dollars? To gauge this economic relevance, and given the 
point on the lasting effect of such statements as argued above, we cumulate the 
estimated daily effects of EMEs over a time horizon of one year. Figure 3 shows these 
cumulated effects by year, also distinguishing between and comparing the overall 
impact of China with that of oil exporting countries (GCC countries plus Russia) and 
other EMEs. The figure shows a striking increase in the cumulated effect of EMEs on 
the US dollar – euro exchange rate since 2002. In fact, the largest overall effect was 
registered in 2006, when statements by all EMEs combined contributed to a 7 
percentage point (p.p.) appreciation of the euro against the US dollar. This compares 
to an actual appreciation of the euro against the US dollar by about 10%, as indicated 
by the black bars in the figure.
9
This suggests that EME communication has indeed exerted a sizeable overall 
effect on the euro exchange rate. Interestingly, the cumulated effect declined 
somewhat in 2007, but was still about 4 p.p. What explains these time variations? 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of EME statements, and their inclinations, over time. 
9 A further interesting feature of the figure is that in 2006 the effect of GCC statements was overall 
larger than those of Chinese authorities. This does not necessarily mean that the GCC economies are 
more important than the Chinese for global and G3 exchange rate configurations. It only means that the 
new information provided by GCC countries about their intentions regarding reserves and FX regimes 
may have been much larger than the new information provided by the Chinese, who had embarked on a 
steady and gradual process of RMB appreciation vis-à-vis the US dollar in July 2005. 18
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It stresses that the frequency of EME statements has continuously increased over 
time, reaching a peak in 2006. However, after 2006 the content of EME 
communication appears to have changed markedly, as EME policy-makers became 
increasingly neutral in their statements, speaking much less frequently about 
abandoning their US dollar peg or of diversifying reserves away from the US dollar, 
while stressing more often their desire to maintain their US dollar link. This might 
reflect a much more cautious communication of EMEs, possibly due to the increased 
pressure on their currency pegs from capital inflows and expectations about currency 
reform.
10
These figures illustrate the potency but also the limitations of our empirical 
approach. The fact that EME policy-makers have stressed less frequently their desire 
to alter their exchange rate regimes and reserve composition could either mean that 
their preferences have changed, or it could imply that they still have the same views 
but have become more cautious in their communication. If this second possibility is 
true, we would be able to capture only a smaller share of the true overall impact of 
EMEs regime changes and portfolio changes. As such, the cumulated effects shown in 
Figure 3 would therefore constitute a lower bound.
11
3.2 Extensions and robustness 
How robust are these findings? There are many potential caveats and limitations to 
these estimates, and it is imperative to gauge how sensitive the results when trying to 
address some of these caveats. 
A first caveat is that many other pieces of information become available and 
influence bilateral currency values. It is obviously impossible to include all factors, 
but we can try to control for relevant US macroeconomic announcements, which have 
been shown in the literature to exert a significant effect on major currencies against 
the US dollar (e.g. Andersen et al. 2003). Table 3 shows the findings for two such 
robustness checks. Models (1) and (3) for the bilateral exchange rates, and (5)-(7) for 
the effective ones, show the results with these macroeconomic news included and 
confirm that the point estimates of EME statements remain hardly changed. 
Moreover, the same holds when including also actual interventions since 2000 by 
Japanese authorities (as in models (3) and (4) of Table 3).
12
10 An alternative explanation – which draws from recent market comments on the possible existence of 
a negative correlation between US dollar movements and oil prices since early 2008 – might be that 
GCC economies refrain from making statements that could adversely impact the US dollar and thereby 
possibly reduce their oil revenues. 
11 We have also tested for time variations in the coefficient estimates in the benchmark model. There 
indeed seems to be an overall increase in the point estimate of EME statements on the euro and the yen 
over time. However, the magnitude of this change is relatively modest, in particular in later years, so 
that our preferred calculations of the contributions are based on constant parameter estimates. 
12 We also included lagged terms of the statements to assess how persistent their impact on major 
currencies is. As expected, we find that lags are statistically insignificant. This suggests that the 
information content of statements is priced in by markets immediately on the day they occur, in line 
with the efficient market hypothesis. Thus we interpret the contemporaneous effects of the statements 
as the permanent effects. 19
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A second issue is how robust the findings are to alternative classifications. For 
this purpose, we reclassify all “neutral” statements (i.e. S = 0) into variables that go 
against the common policy mantra. For instance, a statement of a Japanese official 
which is neutral but comes in a period when the predominant policy stance is to 
weaken the yen – as e.g. occurred in most of 2002-04 – would code, under the 
alternative classification, as a deviation from the common policy mantra and thus as S 
= +1. Models (2) and (4) of Table 3 provide the estimates, but again show that the 
main findings hold, although the point estimates are somewhat smaller. 
Tables 3 – 7 
As a further extension, we next split EME statements into those that talk about 
the exchange rate regime of the respective countries and those that discuss reserve 
diversification. Table 4 shows this split for all EMEs combined, while Tables 5-7 
provide the corresponding estimates individually for Chinese, GCC and Russian 
officials, respectively. Table 4 indicates that the effect of EME statements is very 
similar when officials communicate about the exchange rate regime or reserves.  
However, Tables 5-7 indicate that there are some differences across countries. 
For China, it seems that markets react primarily to statements about the exchange rate 
regime, and not to those about reserve diversification. By contrast, there is no sizeable 
difference across categories of statements for GCC countries or Russia. The lack of 
significance of Chinese statements on reserves may partly stem from the fact that 
Chinese officials hardly ever openly talk about reserve diversification, and possibly 
that market participants expect this to be a less pressing issue than the future of 
China’s domestic exchange rate regime, which has been the main focus of 
international discussions thus far. 
Tables 8 – 9 
We also test the impact of statements by emerging Asian authorities other than 
China, which mainly focus on reserve diversification, and find similar results for the 
dollar-euro (but no statistically significant impact on the dollar-yen). Moreover, we 
tested the impact of statements made by authorities of countries like Iraq, Iran, North 
Korea or Venezuela, which have switched, or signalled their intention to do so, part of 
their international transactions (e.g. oil sales) or foreign reserves in euros. We find 
that these statements have no significant impact on either the currency pairs or the 
effective exchange rates, cautiously suggesting that markets may not react to changes 
in currency focus driven by political considerations, but mainly to those driven by 
economic ones. 
We next turn to other robustness checks. The first one, shown in Table 8, is 
the question as to whether EME communication affects not only the level, but also the 
conditional volatility of the euro, the yen and the US dollar. Table 8 shows the 
estimates from an EGARCH (1,1) model specification in which we test the effect of 
EME statements also on the conditional variance of daily currency returns. The 
findings are in line with those of the literature on foreign exchange communication in 20
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that EME statements tend to lower market volatility (e.g. Fratzscher 2008c), 
suggesting that such statements are considered help reduce uncertainty and settle 
markets. 
As a further robustness check, we also test the impact of emerging market 
statements on their own domestic currencies. However, given that these currencies 
remain pegged or heavily managed, we use 1-year non-deliverable forward rates 
(NDFs) instead.
13 We find some evidence that Chinese statements also matter for its 
domestic currency NDF, but not for the other NDFs. However, giving a meaningful 
interpretation to such results is difficult given the tight management of these 
currencies. 
A further issue is the overall goodness-of-fit of our empirical model. How 
much of the daily euro, dollar and yen fluctuations can actually be explained by this 
model? Table 9 shows the R-squared of partial models in which the models are 
estimated only for those days when policy-makers in individual economies issued 
statements, as compared to all days. For instance, focusing on the US dollar-euro 
shows that EME statements can explain about 15% of the daily variation of this 
currency pair on days when EME officials issued statements. The explanatory power 
of different groups and different currencies varies. However, while such magnitude of 
the R-squared may not sound very large, it still appears quite sizeable given the 
overall volatility of exchange rates (see e.g. Andersen et al. 2003). 
Tables 10 – 11 
As the final part, we would like to understand better the channels and the 
conditions under which EME communication influences major currency 
configurations. One hypothesis is that FX markets are more sensitive to new 
information when there is large uncertainty or when currency misalignments are large. 
Distinguishing between periods with high versus low market volatility (relative to the 
sample average for the corresponding 1-month historical volatility), the estimates 
shown in Table 10 suggest that EME communication has not a significantly larger 
effect in periods of high market volatility relative to periods of low market volatility. 
However, distinguishing between periods of large versus small misalignments 
(defined here as periods when the exchange rate deviates from its 5-year historical 
average), the estimates show a larger effect on the US dollar – euro exchange rate 
when currency misalignments are large.  
Similarly, Table 11 indicates that the effect of EME statements is larger when 
market expectations of an impending change in the respective countries’ currency 
regime is perceived to be relatively likely, based on expectations proxied by forward 
contracts. Indeed, interacting statements by emerging economies with the expected 
change in the Chinese renminbi relative to the US dollar, proxied here by using the 
difference between the 1-year NDFs and the spot rate, the impact of these statements 
is shown to be more than twice larger when markets expect the renminbi to 
appreciate. Conversely, we do not find that the impact is larger when using NDFs for 
13 Results are not shown here to save space but are available from the authors upon request. 21
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the currencies of the Gulf Cooperation Council, perhaps because these are less liquid 
instruments with more limited information content on market expectations than 
renminbi NDFs. Still, the results are somewhat supportive of the expectations 
channel, as the effect of a given statement is larger when also market expectations 
about a future change in the domestic currency regime of China increase.  
4.  Conclusions 
The empirical findings of the paper suggest that statements by systemically important 
EMEs – such as China, the GCC countries and Russia – have a sizeable impact on 
major currency configurations. In particular, it appears that it is in particular the euro 
that is highly sensitive to indications by EMEs to abandon their close US dollar focus 
in their exchange rate regime or in their reserve management. The US dollar-yen 
exchange rate is also found to be sensitive to such statements, but significantly less so 
than the euro. In turn, the US dollar nominal effective exchange rate tends to 
depreciate when such statements occur. These findings are robust to a battery of 
extensions and alternative specifications of the model. 
Moreover, EMEs statements about their intention to move away from a close 
US dollar focus do not only exert a statistically significant but also an economically 
meaningful impact on major currency configurations. Cumulating the effects on an 
annual basis suggest that since 2003/04, statements by EME officials and ensuing 
market expectations contributed a substantial share to the overall appreciation of the 
euro against the US dollar, and possibly as much as 7 percentage points in 2006 alone. 
Interestingly, the effect of EMEs on global exchange rate configurations also seems to 
have declined markedly in 2007. This might reflect the much more cautious 
communication of EMEs, possibly due to the increased pressure on their currency 
pegs from capital inflows and expectations about currency reform. 
Many caveats and limitations apply to our empirical approach, in particular as 
the statements we analyse may capture only a fraction of the true effect of EME 
currency and reserve choices on global exchange rate configurations. However, given 
their rising importance, it is intriguing and important to understand how these 
economies are affecting major currency configurations. We have conducted a broad 
battery of extensions and modifications to the benchmark model, and find that overall 
the empirical findings appear robust. Overall, the strength of the approach is a clean 
identification of factors that are specific to EMEs, which in turn allows us to gauge 
how a future shift away from the US dollar may alter the global setting and role of 
different currencies, in particular the US dollar, the euro and the yen.
The findings of the paper have a number of policy implications. As a first one, 
our empirical results clearly stress that important EMEs, such as China, Russia and 
the GCC economies, have a systematic and sizeable impact on global exchange rate 
configurations. In particular given the magnitude of the reserves held by these 
countries, any shift in market expectations that one or several of these countries could 
loosen their close US dollar focus or diversify reserves affects also the major currency 22
ECB
Working Paper Series No 973
November 2008
pairs, and in particular the euro. The results obviously do not contain any implications 
about what an optimal exchange rate regime choice is for these economies. But the 
findings suggest that policy-makers in these economies are increasingly becoming 
aware of the impact of their statements on global financial markets. This underlines 
that communication can be an important and effective policy tool that needs to be 
used with caution and with a clear idea of what it aims to achieve. 23
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Appendix I: list of the policy-makers included in the database 
US Treasury
US Treasury Secretary 
x Lloyd M. Bentsen: 20 January 1993 – 22 December 1994 
x Robert E. Rubin: 11 January 1995 – 2 July 1999 
x Lawrence H. Summers: 2 July 1999 – 20 January 2001 
x Paul H. O'Neill: 20 January 2001 – 31 December 2002 
x John W. Snow: 3 February 2003 – 30 June 2006 
x Henry M. Paulson: 10 July 2006 – present
US Treasury Deputy Secretary 
x Robert E. Rubin: 20 January 1993 – 22 December 1994 
x Lawrence H. Summers: 11 January 1995 – 2 July 1999 
x Stuart E. Eizenstat: 2 July 1999 – 20 January 2001 
x Kenneth W. Dam: 20 January 2001 – 31 December 2002 
x Samuel W. Bodman: 17 February 2004 – 31 January 2005 
x Robert M. Kimmit: 16 August 2005 – present 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Chairman 
x Alan Greenspan: 11 August 1987 – 31 January 2006 
x Ben Bernanke: 1 February 2006 – present 
Current Members of the Board 
x Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman
x Kevin M. Warsh 
x Randall S. Kroszner 
x Frederic S. Mishkin 




x Willem F. Duisenberg: 1 June 1998 – 30 October 2003 
x Jean-Claude Trichet: 1 November 2003 – present  25
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Vice-President 
x Christian Noyer, 1 June 1998 – June 2002 
x Lucas D. Papademos, June 2002 – present 
Other current Members of the Executive Board and the Governing Council 
x Lorenzo Bini Smaghi 
x José Manuel González-Páramo 
x Jürgen Stark 
x Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell 
Other current Members of the Governing Council 
x Guy Quaden, Governor, Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de 
Belgique
x Axel A. Weber, President, Deutsche Bundesbank 
x John Hurley Governor, Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of 
Ireland
x Nicholas C. Garganas, Governor, Bank of Greece  
x Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor, Banco de España 
x Christian Noyer, Governor, Banque de France 
x Mario Draghi, Governor, Banca d'Italia 
x Athanasios Orphanides, Governor, Central Bank of Cyprus 
x Yves Mersch, Governor, Banque centrale du Luxembourg 
x Michael C. Bonello, Governor, Central Bank of Malta 
x Nout Wellink, President, De Nederlandsche Bank 
x Klaus Liebscher, Governor, Oesterreichische Nationalbank 
x Vítor Manuel Ribeiro Constâncio, Governor, Banco de Portugal 
x Marko Kranjec, Governor, Banka Slovenije 
x Erkki Liikanen, Governor, Suomen Pankki - Finlands Bank 
Ministry of Finance (Japan)
Minister 
x Yoshiro Hayashi: 1992 – 1993 
x Hirohisa Fujii: 1993 – 1994 
x Masayoshi Takemura: 1994 – 1996 
x Wataru Kubo: 1996 
x Hiroshi Mitsuzuka: 1996 – 1998 
x Hikaru Matsunaga: 1998 
x Masajuro Shiokawa: 2001 – 2003 
x Sadakazu Tanigaki: 2003 – 2006 
x Koji Omi: 2006 – 2007 
x Fukushiro Nukaga: 2007 – present 26
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x Mr. Yasushi Mieno: 17 December 1989 – 16 December 1994 
x Mr. Yasuo Matsushita: 17 December 1994 – 20 March 1998 
x Mr. Masaru Hayami: 20 March 1998 – 19 March 2003 
x Mr. Toshihiko Fukui: 20 March 2003 – 19 March 2008 
x Prof. Masaaki Shirakawa: 9 April 2008 – present 
China
Presidents of the People's Republic of China 
 
x Jiang Zemin: 27 March 1993 – 15 March 2003 
x Hu Jintao: since 15 March 2003 – present 
List of Premiers of the People’s Republic of China 
x Li Peng: 1987 – 17 March 1998 
x Zhu Rongji: 17 March 1998 – 16 March 2003  
x Wen Jiabao: since 16 March 2003 
Governor of the People’s Bank of China 
x Dai Xianglong: June 1995 – December 2002 
x Zhou Xiaochuan: December 2002 – present 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) 
 
x Various relevant officials 
 
Other emerging Asian economies
Hong Kong 
x Joseph Yam, Chief Executive, Hong Kong Monetary Authority: April 1993 – 
present
India 
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Malaysia 
x Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister: 16 July 1981 – 31 October 2003  
x Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor, Bank Negara Malaysia: May 2000 – present 
Republic of China (Taiwan) 
x Yu Shyi-kun, Premier: 1 February 2002 – 1 February 2005 
x Wu Rong-I, Vice Premier 
x Hsu Yi-Hsiung, Deputy Governor, Central Bank of the Republic of China 
(Taiwan): March 1998 – present 
Singapore 
x Government of Singapore Investment Corp. (GIC), incl. Chairman Lee Kuan 
Yew
South Korea 
x Han Duck-Soo, Minister of Finance: 14 March 2006 – July 2006; Prime 
Minister: 9 March 2007 – present
x Park Seung, Bank of Korea, March 2002-March 2006 
Russian Federation
Minister of Finance 
x Alexei Leonidovich Kudrin: 18 May 2000 – present 
Chair of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation 
x Viktor Gerashchenko: 1998 – March 2002. 
x Sergei Mikhailovich Ignatiev: 20 March 2002 – present 
Gulf Cooperation Council
Bahrain 
x Rasheed Mohammed Al Maraj, Head, Bahrain Monetary Agency 
x Sheikh Ahmed bin Mohammad al-Khalifa, Minister of Finance 
 
Kuwait 
x Sheikh Salem Abdul-Aziz al-Sabah, Governor, Central Bank of Kuwait 
x Bader al-Humaidhi, Minister of Finance 28
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Oman 
x Hamood Sangour al-Zadjali, Executive President, Central Bank of Oman 
Qatar 
x Abdullah Al-Attiya, Governor, Qatar Central Bank 
x Sheikh Abdullah bin Saud al-Thani, Governor, Qatar Central Bank 
x Youssef Hussein Kamal, Minister of Finance 
 
Saudi Arabia 
x Hamad Saud al-Sayyari, Governor, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
x Muhammad Al-Jasser, Vice Governor, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
x Ibrahim al-Assaf, Minister of Finance 
United Arab Emirates 




x Various press reports on Iran’s plans to invoice oil in euros and change the 
composition of central bank reserves 
Iraq 
x Various senior foreign and Iraqi officials on Iraq’s decision to invoice oil in 
euros and subsequently in dollars 
North Korea 
x Reports from China's Xinhua news agency on North Korea’s decision to 
convert dollar-denominated accounts into euro and other currencies 
Venezuela 
x Hugo Chavez, President: 2 February 1999 – present 29
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Appendix II: Examples of classification of statements by category 




Date Time Policy-maker Statement
28/08/2005 23:48 GMT Governor Zhou                           
(People's Bank of China)
"I think it is very clear that China is introducing a new exchange r
mechanism. It is not a one-time adjustment." 
13/11/2007 11:19 GMT Governor al-Suwaidi                 
(Central bank of the UAE)
"The dirham's peg to the U.S. dollar has served the economy of the U
very well in the past... However, we have reached a crossroads now wit
further deterioration in the U.S. dollar."
09/10/2004 03:32 GMT Prime Minister Wen Jiabao        
(China)
"We will take gradual steps towards building a flexible and resili
exchange system."
24/10/2006 04:59 GMT Governor Hamad Saud al-
Sayyari (Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency)
"There is no intention to change the exchange rate." 
08/05/1998 02:10 GMT Governor Dai                              
(People's Bank of China)
"We still have enough confidence to say we will be able to maintain a sta
currency…It goes without saying that China has to pay a certain price
maintain a stable renminbi."




Date Time Policy-maker Statement
08/01/2002 13:32 GMT Finance Minister Xiang 
Huaicheng (China)
"China has always thought the euro important and thinks that it will so
day be on an equal footing with the U.S. dollar. It is inevitable that the e
will become some countries' reserve currency."
11/07/2005 17:21 GMT Governor al-Suwaidi                 
(Central bank of the UAE)
"The euro has declined a lot and it is tempting to buy... if they see
tempting, they might say, 'OK, why don't you put 5 percent in euros?'" 
24/03/2005 11:52 GMT Deputy chief of SAFE Wei 
Benhua  (China)
"When managing our foreign exchange reserves, we insist on the principle
safety, liquidity and profitability." 
08/12/2004 13:33 GMT Governor Sergei Ignatyev           
(Central Bank of Russia)
"We are indeed thinking about the possibility of a change to the structure
our foreign exchange reserves. But at the same time they will not be abr
changes." 
05/03/2006 01:25 GMT Governor Zhou                           
(People's Bank of China)
"The forex reserves are still growing. Some people are concerned that
amount of dollar assets in the reserves will fall. But that is not the case." 
10/04/2005 10:46 GMT Governor Park Seung                  
(Bank of Korea)
Korea "would not seek to diversify currencies in its foreign reserves aw
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
USD/EUR
Relax USD reference to appreciate
Relax USD reference to depreciate
Maintain USD reference
  Source: Bloomberg and authors’ database. 






2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
USD/EUR
Relax USD reference to appreciate
Relax USD reference to depreciate
Maintain USD reference
  Source: Bloomberg and authors’ database. 
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
USD/EUR
Diversification away from USD
Diversification into USD
Composition unchanged
Source: Bloomberg and authors’ database. 






2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
USD/EUR
Diversification away from USD
Diversification into USD
Composition unchanged
Source: Bloomberg and authors’ database. 32
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Figure 3: Cumulated impact of EME statements 






2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
China Oil exporters Other EMEs Total USD/EUR change (%)
Source: Bloomberg and authors’ estimates. 






2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Weaker US dollar links
Neutral
Stronger US dollar links
Source: authors’ database. 34
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  Source: Bloomberg and authors’ calculations. 
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Tables











Chinese authorities 149 48 6 95
  o/w: PBC President 105 31 4 70
O t h e r  e m e r g i n g  A s i a  a u t h o r i t i e s 1010
Russian authorities 12435
GCC authorities 37 6 0 31
All emerging market authorities 199 58 10 131
Source: authors' own compilation and calculations.
Sample period: January 2000-December 2007.
of which:









Chinese authorities 12 7 1 4
Other emerging Asia authorities 23 12 1 10
Russian authorities 13 6 2 5
GCC authorities 20 19 0 1
All emerging market authorities 68 44 4 20
Source: authors' own compilation and calculations.
Sample period: January 2000-December 2007.
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Table 2: Impact of official statements by emerging economy authorities on G3 exchange rates
(1. Jan. 2000 - 31 Dec. 2007)
Euro US dollar Yen
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Emerging economy authorities 0.245 *** 0.240 *** 0.145 *** 0.142 *** 0.072 ** -0.107 *** 0.051
(0.043) (0.043) (0.055) (0.055) (0.028) (0.041) (0.049)
All euro area authorities 0.191 *** 0.068
(0.059) (0.056)
All US authorities -0.040 -0.024
(0.082) (0.081)
All Japanese authorities 0.118 * 0.166 ***
(0.062) (0.059)
ECB President 0.424 *** 0.092 0.187 *** -0.096 -0.043
(0.097) (0.126) (0.069) (0.080) (0.137)
US Treasury Secretary -0.023 -0.029 0.063 -0.028 -0.043
(0.087) (0.082) (0.057) (0.055) (0.079)
Japanese Minister of Finance 0.128 * 0.158 ** -0.045 0.024 0.038
(0.073) (0.067) (0.046) (0.050) (0.047)
Constant 0.014 0.019 -0.002 -0.002 0.008 -0.005 -0.009
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012)
Observations 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
           (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%.
                 1) Nominal effective exchange rates
USD/EUR USD/JPY
A. Bilateral exchange rates B. NEERs
1)






t t X S r H F E D      ¦
with rt as daily exchange rate returns, S = S
e + S
res a [-1; 0; +1] indicator variable capturing statements on both exchange rate regime and reserve 
composition and X a vector of controls including statements by G3 authorities. The equation is estimated by OLS with robust standard errors. 37
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Table 3: Impact of official statements by emerging economy authorities on G3 exchange rates – 
(Robustness checks; 1. Jan. 2000 - 31 Dec. 2007)
Euro US dollar Yen
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 ) ( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )
Emerging economy authorities 0.233 *** 0.127 ** 0.076 *** -0.111 *** 0.056
(0.044) (0.055) 0.150 ** (0.029) (0.042) (0.050)
- Alternative classification 0.179 *** (0.057)
(0.056)
ECB President 0.424 *** 0.078 0.210 *** -0.142 ** -0.024
(0.100) (0.135) (0.071) (0.072) (0.142)
- Alternative classification 0.280 *** 0.051
(0.076) (0.083)
US Treasury Secretary -0.005 -0.029 0.066 -0.024 -0.062
(0.083) (0.082) (0.060) (0.057) (0.081)
- Alternative classification -0.087 -0.040
(0.079) (0.076)
Japan's Minister of Finance 0.156 ** 0.162 ** -0.045 0.023 0.020
(0.076) (0.068) (0.047) (0.051) (0.046)
- Alternative classification 0.159 ** 0.135 **
(0.068) (0.060)
Actual Japanese interventions 0.0002 ** 0.0002 ** 0.0001 *
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
US macroeconomic shocks YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.017 0.021 0.004 0.000 0.007 -0.007 0.000
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012)
Observations 2,083 2,104 2,083 2,104 2,083 2,083 2,083
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
           (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%.




A. Bilateral exchange rates
USD/JPY






t t X S r H F E D      ¦
with rt as daily exchange rate returns, S = S
e + S
res a [-1; 0; +1] indicator variable capturing statements on both exchange rate regime and reserve 
composition and X a vector of controls including, depending on the specification, statements by G3 authorities, US macroeconomic shocks and 
actual Japanese foreign exchange interventions. A further robustness check consists in testing an alternative classification, where all “neutral” 
statements (i.e. S = 0) are classified into variables that go against the common policy mantra. For instance, a statement of a Japanese official 
which is neutral but comes in a period when the predominant policy stance is to weaken the yen – as e.g. occurred in most of 2002-04 – would 
code, under the alternative classification, as a deviation from the common policy mantra and thus as S = +1. The equation is estimated by OLS 
with robust standard errors. 38
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Table 4: Impact of official statements by emerging economy authorities on G3 exchange 
rates – Reserve composition vs. exchange rate regime; 1. Jan. 2000 - 31 Dec. 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Emerging economy authorities
  - Reserve composition 0.243 *** 0.149 * 0.079 *** -0.095 * -0.006
(0.056) (0.077) (0.030) (0.050) (0.065)
  - Exchange rate regime 0.234 *** 0.128 * 0.072 * -0.107 * 0.078
(0.057) (0.077) (0.040) (0.056) (0.070)
ECB President 0.427 *** 0.415 *** 0.094 0.087 0.188 *** 0.185 *** -0.097 -0.092 -0.044 -0.045
(0.096) (0.095) (0.123) (0.124) (0.070) (0.069) (0.082) (0.079) (0.136) (0.137)
US Treasury Secretary -0.028 -0.027 -0.032 -0.032 0.061 0.061 -0.026 -0.026 -0.044 -0.044
(0.087) (0.087) (0.082) (0.082) (0.057) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.079) (0.079)
Japanese Minister of Finance 0.129 * 0.132 * 0.159 ** 0.161 ** -0.044 -0.044 0.023 0.022 0.039 0.038
(0.073) (0.073) (0.067) (0.067) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050) (0.050) (0.047) (0.047)
Constant 0.024 * 0.023 * 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.009 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.009
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
           (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%.
                 1) Nominal effective exchange rates
Yen
A. Bilateral exchange rates B. NEERs
1)
USD/EUR USD/JPY Euro US dollar
Table 5: Impact of official statements by Chinese authorities on G3 exchange rates – 
Reserve composition vs. exchange rate regime; 1. Jan. 2000 - 31 Dec. 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Chinese authorities
  - Reserve composition 0.048 -0.094 0.093 -0.141 -0.143
(0.104) (0.212) (0.057) (0.103) (0.176)
  - Exchange rate regime 0.189 *** 0.168 * 0.055 -0.080 0.100
(0.067) (0.093) (0.044) (0.062) (0.084)
ECB President 0.419 *** 0.426 *** 0.090 0.095 0.186 *** 0.188 *** -0.094 -0.097 -0.043 -0.040
(0.094) (0.095) (0.122) (0.122) (0.070) (0.069) (0.008) (0.079) (0.136) (0.136)
US Treasury Secretary -0.029 -0.028 -0.031 -0.032 0.060 0.061 -0.023 -0.026 -0.042 -0.044
(0.087) (0.087) (0.082) (0.082) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.055) (0.079) (0.079)
Japanese Minister of Finance 0.133 * 0.135 * 0.162 ** 0.163 ** -0.043 -0.043 0.022 0.021 0.039 0.040
(0.073) (0.073) (0.067) (0.067) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050) (0.050) (0.047) (0.047)
Constant 0.028 * 0.025 * 0.004 0.000 0.010 0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012)
Observations 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
           (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%.
                 1) Nominal effective exchange rates
Yen
A. Bilateral exchange rates B. NEERs
1)
USD/EUR USD/JPY Euro US dollar










t X S S r H F E E D      ¦
with rt as daily exchange rate returns, S
e and S
res as two [-1; 0; +1] indicator variables capturing statements on exchange rate regime and reserve 
composition, respectively, and X a vector of controls including statements by G3 authorities. The equation is estimated by OLS with robust 
standard errors. The equation is estimated by using statements by all emerging market policy-makers (Table 4) and only by Chinese policy-
makers (Table 5). 39
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Table 6: Impact of official statements by GCC authorities on G3 exchange rates – 
Reserve composition vs. exchange rate regime; 1. Jan. 2005 - 31 Dec. 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
GCC authorities
  - Reserve composition 0.362 *** 0.309 *** 0.126 ** -0.141 0.050
(0.104) (0.139) (0.053) (0.099) (0.129)
  - Exchange rate regime 0.479 *** 0.077 0.296 *** -0.195 -0.014
(0.088) (0.120) (0.115) (0.186) (0.198)
ECB President 0.311 *** 0.316 *** 0.056 0.062 0.130 * 0.131 * -0.078 -0.079 -0.073 -0.072
(0.086) (0.086) (0.213) (0.213) (0.068) (0.068) (0.109) (0.109) (0.239) (0.239)
US Treasury Secretary -0.023 -0.028 0.062 0.055 -0.069 * -0.070 * 0.024 0.026 0.141 0.140
(0.138) (0.138) (0.124) (0.124) (0.038) (0.038) (0.112) (0.112) (0.149) (0.149)
Japanese Minister of Finance 0.145 0.150 0.215 -0.208 -0.049 -0.048 -0.057 -0.059 -0.008 -0.007
(0.231) (0.231) (0.206) (0.206) (0.094) (0.094) (0.183) (0.183) (0.176) (0.176)
Constant 0.008 0.014 -0.022 -0.015 0.008 0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.021 -0.020
(0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 781 781 781 781 781 781 781 781 781 781
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
           (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%.
                 1) Nominal effective exchange rates
Yen
A. Bilateral exchange rates B. NEERs
1)
USD/EUR USD/JPY Euro US dollar
Table 7: Impact of official statements by Russian authorities on G3 exchange rates – 
Reserve composition vs. exchange rate regime; 1. Jan. 2004 - 31 Dec. 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Russian authorities
  - Reserve composition 0.260 ** 0.195 -0.037 0.001
(0.108) (0.132) (0.073) (0.095)
  - Exchange rate regime 0.413 *** -0.106 0.120 -0.400 *** 0.039 0.039
(0.149) (0.147) (0.094) (0.098) (0.103) (0.103)
ECB President 0.281 *** 0.236 *** 0.076 0.071 0.066 0.060 0.003 0.031 -0.057 -0.057
(0.089) (0.082) (0.171) (0.166) (0.067) (0.067) (0.098) (0.100) (0.192) (0.192)
US Treasury Secretary -0.087 -0.091 -0.080 -0.082 -0.053 -0.053 0.064 0.066 0.064 0.064
(0.139) (0.139) (0.120) (0.120) (0.055) (0.055) (0.092) (0.092) (0.122) (0.122)
Japanese Minister of Finan 0.221 * 0.222 * 0.124 0.125 0.041 0.04 -0.062 -0.062 -0.004 -0.004
(0.114) (0.113) (0.102) (0.102) (0.045) (0.045) (0.074) (0.074) (0.064) (0.064)
Constant 0.029 * 0.029 * 0.001 0.002 0.012 0.012 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Observations 1,043 1,043 1,043 1,043 1,043 1,043 1,043 1,043 1,043 1,043
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
           (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%.
                 1) Nominal effective exchange rates




Euro US dollar Yen










t X S S r H F E E D      ¦
with rt as daily exchange rate returns, S
e and S
res as two [-1; 0; +1] indicator variables capturing statements on exchange rate regime and reserve 
composition, respectively, and X a vector of controls including statements by G3 authorities. The equation is estimated by OLS with robust 
standard errors. The equation is estimated by using statements only by GCC policy-makers (Table 6) and Russian policy-makers (Table 7). 40
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Table 8: Impact of official statements by EME authorities on exchange rate volatility – 
EGARCH estimation results; 1. Jan. 2000 - 31 Dec. 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Mean equation
Emerging economy authorities 0.231 *** 0.228 *** 0.224 *** 0.227 *** 0.149 *** 0.151 *** 0.156 *** 0.062 ** -0.108 *** 0.024
(0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.025) (0.025) (0.038)
ECB President (0.394) *** 0.392 *** 0.169 0.155 ** -0.083 -0.052
(0.150) (0.141) (0.120) (0.068) (0.078) (0.133)
US Treasury Secretary -0.064 -0.042 -0.009 0.007 -0.003 -0.036 -0.002
(0.071) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.043) (0.055) (0.050)
Japan's Finance Minister 0.100 0.102 0.131 * 0.132 * -0.036 0.041 0.01
(0.074) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074) (0.039) (0.048) (0.049)
Constant 0.019 * 0.016 -0.018 0.023 * -0.007 -0.002 -0.001 0.012 * -0.004 -0.008
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.082) (0.011)
Conditional variance equation
Emerging economy authorities -0.037 ** -0.026 * -0.049 ** 0.040 ** -0.087 *** -0.088 *** -0.084 *** -0.049 * 0.357 *** -0.093 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.026) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.103) (0.034)
ECB President -0.041 0.047 0.057 0.029 0.146 -0.031
(0.043) (0.050) (0.090) (0.056) (0.306) (0.091)
US Treasury Secretary 0.046 * 0.046 * 0.015 0.000 0.006 0.391 ** 0.021
(0.025) (0.025) (0.050) (0.050) (0.037) (0.174) (0.043)
Japan's Finance Minister -0.034 * -0.041 *** -0.038 -0.042 * -0.016 -0.401 ** 0.027
(0.013) (0.016) (0.026) (0.027) (0.018) (0.172) (0.027)
Constant -0.001 -0.004 ** -0.004 ** -0.008 *** -0.040 *** -0.041 *** -0.040 *** -0.009 -1.811 *** -0.027 ***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.357) (0.007)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
           (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%.
                 1) Nominal effective exchange rates
B. NEERs
1) A. Bilateral exchange rates
USD/EUR USD/JPY Euro US dollar Yen
Table 8 reports regression results over January 2000-December 2007 of an alternative specification to the benchmark empirical model where 
daily exchange rate returns are modelled as an exponential GARCH (EGARCH) à la Nelson (1991) in order to account for non-normality, 
negative skewness, excess kurtosis and serial correlation in the data (see e.g. Fratzscher, 2008c for further details). The conditional variance of 
the daily exchange rates is expressed as a function of past variance, innovations and oral statements. 
Table 9 - Explanatory power of official statements of daily exchange rate movements 
A. USD/EUR exchange rate R
2   (obs.) R
2   (obs.) R
2   (obs.) R
2   (obs.) R
2   (obs.)
   - On any given day 0.004 (2,104) 0.008 (2,104) 0.000 (2,104) 0.000 (2,104) 0.014 (2,104)
  - On statement days 0.329 (63) 0.145 (295) 0.063 (82) 0.060 (166) 0.063 (671)
B. USD/JPY exchange rate
   - On any given day 0.000 (2,104) 0.002 (2,104) 0.000 (2,104) 0.002 (2,104) 0.005 (2,104)
  - On statement days 0.018 (63) 0.042 (295) 0.029 (82) 0.067 (166) 0.037 (671)
C. Euro
   - On any given day 0.002 (2,104) 0.001 (2,158) 0.000 (2,104) 0.000 (2,104) 0.004 (2,104)
  - On statement days 0.179 (63) 0.042 (295) 0.000 (82) 0.006 (166) 0.035 (671)
D. US dollar
   - On any given day 0.000 (2,104) 0.003 (2,158) 0.000 (2,104) 0.000 (2,104) 0.005 (2,104)
  - On statement days 0.059 (63) 0.055 (295) 0.011 (82) 0.002 (166) 0.018 (671)
D. Yen
   - On any given day 0.000 (2,104) 0.000 (2,158) 0.000 (2,104) 0.000 (2,104) 0.001 (2,104)
  - On statement days 0.002 (63) 0.002 (295) 0.014 (82) 0.013 (166) 0.008 (671)
Author(s) of official statements included as explanatory variable(s) in the regression
Japan's  Minister of 
Finance




Table 9 reports measures of overall goodness-of-fit of the benchmark empirical model in which the models are estimated only for those days 
when policy-makers in individual economies issued statements, as compared to all days. 41
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Table 10: Impact of official statements on the USD/EUR under selected market 
conditions
(1. Jan. 2000 - 31 Dec. 2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
"Low" volatility
1)
  - ECB President 0.346 *** 0.355 ***
(0.076) (0.083)




  - ECB President 0.535 *** 0.530 ***
(0.198) (0.199)
  - Emerging economy authorities 0.274 **
(0.128)
Absence of exchange rate "misalignment"
2)
  - Euro area authorities 0.043 0.052
(0.111) (0.111)




  - Euro area authorities 0.246 *** 0.257 ***
(0.069) (0.069)
  - Emerging economy authorities 0.311 ***
(0.062)
"Leaning against the wind"
3)
  - ECB President 0.602 *** 0.602 ***
(0.196) (0.200)
  - Emerging economy authorities 0.002
(0.108)
Constant 0.023 * 0.014 0.02 0.011 0.215 0.215
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.168) (0.170)
Observations 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 35 35
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
           (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%.
1) Periods of low (high) volatility are defined as those when the 1-month historical volatility of the daily USD/EUR return is below (above) average.
2) Periods of exchange rate misalignments are defined as those when the USD/EUR exceeds its 5-year historical average.
3) A statement "leans against the wind" if it goes in the direction opposite to exchange rate trend (defined here as the 3-month change in the USD/EUR). 
Table 10 reports regression results using a modified version of the benchmark model over January 2000-December 2007, namely: 
t
EA
t t t t t IO S D S r H J E E D   u     ) ( 2 1
with rt as daily exchange rate returns, S = S
e + S
res a [-1; 0; +1] indicator variable capturing statements on both exchange rate regime and reserve 
composition, IO a [-1; 0; +1] indicator variable for statements by euro area authorities, and D a [0,1] dummy capturing periods of low vs. high 
market volatility, small vs. large misalignments, not leaning vs. leaning against the wind (all defined as explained in notes 1), 2) and 3) of Table 
10). The equation is estimated by OLS with robust standard errors. 42
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Table 11: Evidence for the expectations channel 
(1. Jan. 2000 - 31 Dec. 2007)
Emerging economy authorities 0.228 ** 0.377 *** 0.405 *** 0.392 *** 0.366 ***
(0.101) (0.051) (0.054) (0.054) (0.052)
Emerging economy authorities × 0.590 *
Lagged renminbi expected appreciation
1 (0.361)
Emerging economy authorities × 0.355
Lagged Saudi riyal expected appreciation
1 (0.321)
Emerging economy authorities × 0.417 *
Lagged Kuwaiti dinar expected appreciation
1 (0.230)
Emerging economy authorities × 0.292
Lagged UAE dirham expected appreciation
1 (0.255)
Emerging economy authorities × 0.091
Lagged Barhaini dinar expected appreciation
1 (0.210)
All euro area authorities 0.142 0.140 0.113 0.165 0.134
(0.121) (0.119) (0.116) (0.116) (0.118)
Lagged emerging currency expected appreciation -0.014 -0.015 -0.016 0.007 -0.015
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Constant -0.322 ** -0.187 * -0.314 ** -0.190 *** -0.114
(0.154) (0.107) (0.136) (0.073) (0.070)
Observations
2) 254 254 254 230 254
R
2 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.14
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
           (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%.
                 1) 1-year forward rate minus spot exchange rate vs. US dollar. The variable is normalised to lie between 0 and 1.
                 2) The estimation is done only on days when there are statements by emerging economy authorities.
USD/EUR
Table 11 reports robustness check results using a modified version of the benchmark model over January 2000-December 2007, namely: 
t t
y
t t t t e f S S r H E E D   u       )] ( [ 1
1
1 2 1
with rt as daily exchange rate returns, S = S
e + S
res a [-1; 0; +1] indicator variable capturing statements on both exchange rate regime and reserve 
composition, (f –e) the (lagged) difference between the 1-year non-deliverable forward rate and the spot rate of a given emerging market currency
which is used to proxy market expectations of an impending change in the corresponding country’s currency regime. The equation is estimated by 
OLS with robust standard errors. 43
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